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Under our system of law, judicial power to grant a divorce - juris-
diction, strictly speaking - is founded on domicil. The framers of the
Constitution were familiar with this jurisdictional prerequisite, and since
1789 neither this Court nor any other court in the English-speaking
world has questioned it1
The above statement, made by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in 1945,
has been accepted as gospel by the vast majority of courts in cases
dealing with the subject. The purposes of this note are to "question"
this "jurisdictional prerequisite," to point out the weaknesses of the
domicile theory, and to discuss the departures which have been made
from it.
THE DOMICILE THEORY
An action for divorce is regarded as being in the nature of an in
rem proceeding, with the marital status constituting the res.2 There-
fore, jurisdiction over the defendant, necessary in an in personam
proceeding, is not required, since jurisdiction over the res gives the
court power to render a decree. Since the marital status is an in-
tangible, some fictitious basis is necessary to determine whether the
res is properly before the court.
For purposes of divorce jurisdiction, the marital status has gen-
erally been regarded as existing at the place where the parties are
domiciled,8 i.e., where they are physically present with an intent to
remain indefinitely.4 However, it is recognized that a husband and
wife who are not living together may have separate domiciles, and in
that situation the marital status is deemed to exist at the domicile of
either spouse.5  This concept, together with the in rem theory of
jurisdiction, makes it possible for a court to render a valid ex parte
divorce decree against a non-resident defendant, if the plaintiff is
domiciled within the state.
Existing law as to interstate recognition of these ex parte decrees
is founded upon the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in
the two famous Williams cases.' That litigation arose out of the fol-
1. Williams v. North Carolina (H), 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945).
2. GOODRICH, CONFLICr OF LAws 411 (3d ed. 1949).
3. Ibid.
4. STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAws 23 (2d ed. 1951).
5. GooDRIcH, CONFLIcT OF L&ws 411-12 (3d ed. 1949).
6. Williams v. North Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Williams v. North Carolina (H),
325 U.S. 226 (1945).
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lowing facts: Mr. Williams and Mrs. Hendrix, who had lived with
their respective spouses in North Carolina, went to Nevada and,
after six weeks, each filed an action for divorce. The absent spouses
were served by constructive process and did not appear. Upon find-
ings that each petitioner had a bona fide domicile in Nevada, the two
were granted divorces from their respective spouses. They were then
married to each other and returned to North Carolina, where they
lived together until prosecuted and convicted of bigamous cohabita-
tion. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the conviction,
following the principle of Haddock v. Haddock7 that the state of
the matrimonial domicile need not give full faith and credit to an
ex parte divorce decree obtained by one spouse who wrongfully left
the other in the matrimonial domicile.
In Williams v. North Carolina (I)8 the Supreme Court reversed
the North Carolina court, holding that an ex parte divorce decree
founded upon the bona fide domicile of but one of the parties must
be accorded full faith and credit, thus overruling Haddock. Since the
Nevada court's finding of domicile had not been questioned, the case
was remanded to the North Carolina courts.
Upon retrial, the jury, after a proper charge by the court, found
that the parties had not been bona fide domiciliaries of Nevada at
the time they had obtained their divorces. They were again found
guilty, and in Williams v. North Carolina (II),' the conviction was
affirmed by the Supreme Court. It was held that the court of the
forum could re-examine the question of domicile, and if it found that
the petitioning spouse had not obtained a bona fide domicile in the
divorcing state, the forum need not give full faith and credit to the
ex parte decree.
DEFECTS OF THE DOMICILE THEORY
In his vigorous dissent in Williams II, Mr. Justice Rutledge de-
nounced the domicile theory as unworkable, stating:
The Constitution does not mention domicil. Nowhere does it posit
the powers of the state or the nation upon that amorphous, highly varia-
ble common-law conception. Judges have imported it. The importation,
it should be dear by now, has failed in creating a workable constitutional
criterion for this delicate region.' °
As a substantive concept, domicile is inherently nebulous, since it
depends partially upon a subjective mental state, namely, the intent
of the person to remain. Although the term in its ordinary, non-legal
sense, suggests a certain degree of permanence, a person's legal domi-
7. 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
8. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
9. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
10. Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226, 255 (1945) (dissenting opinion).
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cile "can be changed in the twinkling of an eye, the time it takes a
man to make up his mind to remain where he is when he is away from
home.""' Though instantaneous, this decision is sufficient to give
the state in which he is present the power to dissolve his marriage.
All of his belongings, his business, his family, his established interests
and intimate relations may remain where they have always been. Yet if
he is but physically present elsewhere, without even bag or baggage, and
undergoes the mental flash, in a moment he has created a new
domicil.... 12
These elusive, subjective qualities of domicile as a substantive
concept cause procedural weaknesses when domicile is used as a juris-
dictional basis. First, this subjective factor encourages untruthful
testimony on the part of the plaintiff. Every year many persons, un-
able to obtain divorces at home because of strict divorce laws, visit
one of the states with short residence requirements, such as Nevada,' 8
and obtain dissolutions of their marriages in proceedings which are
often uncontested. The need for proof of domicile leads to "a mild
sort of perjury . . . when the applicant mumbles, in reply to the
judge's mumble, that she does intend to continue residence in
Nevada."'"
The subjective intent factor also makes jurisdiction based on
domicile particularly vulnerable to collateral attack. Whether the
necessary intent exists in the mind of a person must be determined by
inferences from extrinsic circumstances, and often the lack of intent
becomes apparent only after the court has decided the question. For
example, the successful plaintiff may leave the state soon after the
decree is granted. However, the prompt departure is a fact unavail-
able to the court granting the divorce. Although the divorce court
may have reached its decision in good faith, the issue of domicile may
be decided the other way when the decree is relied upon in another
state, because of the additional facts.
The results which may ensue from this vulnerability to collateral
attack are strikingly illustrated by the predicament of the parties in
the Williams cases. As Mr. Williams and his second wife learned to
their dismay, migratory ex parte divorces based upon domicile of one
of the parties are not conclusive. A man may be treated as married
in one state and divorced in another. Persons who remarry on the
strength of ex parte decrees may become bigamists and the children
of such marriages may be illegitimate.
11. Id. at 257.
12. Id. at 258.
13. The residence requirement in Nevada is six weeks. NEv. REv. STAT. § 125.020 (1957).
Other statutes setting up short residence requirements are: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1208
(Supp. 1957) (sixty days before commencement of action and three months before judgment);
IDAHo CODE ANN. § 32-701 (1948) (six weeks); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-1 (Supp. 1959)
(three months); WYo. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 20-48 (1957) (sixty days).
14. Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1, 28 n.9 (1955) (dissenting opinion).
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter's statement, quoted at the outset of this
note, that the "framers of the Constitution were familiar with
[domicile as a] .. . jurisdictional prerequisite,' u5 appears to be of
doubtful validity. The concept of domicile in divorce jurisdiction
was not a part of the common law at the time of the American Revo-
lution and the framing of the Constitution, because dissolution of
marriage had been administered in England by the ecclesiastical
courts.' 6
Domicile seems to have been selected as a basis for divorce juris-
diction largely because of the erroneous interpretation of a statement
made by Story in 1834."7 But it was not until 1895 that a case aris-
ing in Ceylon, LeMesurier v. LeMesurier,8 established the theory at
common law.
Whatever its origin, the domicile concept of divorce jurisdiction
has become outmoded in today's mobile social system.
"[H]ome" in the modem world is often a trailer or tourist camp. Auto-
mobiles, nation-wide business and multiple family dwelling units have
deprived the institution, though not the idea, of its former general fix-
ation to soil and locality.'
In the area of divorce jurisdiction, as well as in other areas, domi-
cile "tends to be a less and less useful fiction. ' 20
DEPARTURES FROM THE DOMICILE THEORY
A statute in which divorce jurisdiction is based upon some con-
cept other than domicile creates constitutional problems of both due
process and full faith and credit. Two questions arise: (1) Is a
decree based upon such a statute valid where rendered? (2) Is rec-
ognition of the decree mandatory in other jurisdictions?
Although there have been numerous statements to the effect that
domicile of at least one of the parties is the only possible jurisdic-
tional basis for divorce,2' the United States Supreme Court has never
expressly so held. In practically every case in which domicile has
been said to be a jurisdictional necessity, it was required by the di-
vorce statutes of the forum state. Of course, where domicile is a
statutory jurisdictional prerequisite it is correct to say that jurisdic-
tion for divorce is founded upon this concept. But it is another mat-
15. Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945).
16. MADDEN, DoMEsTIc RELATIONS 256-60 (1931).
17. See Crownover v. Crownover, 58 N.M. 597, 615-16, 274 P.2d 127, 138-39 (1954)
(concurring opinion), citing STORY, CONFLICT or LAws § 230(a) (1841).
18. [1895) A.C. 517 (Ceylon).
19. Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226, 257 (1945) (dissenting opinion).
20. Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 429 (1939) (concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
21. E.g., Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 349 (1948); Williams v. North Carolina (I),
325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945); Williams v. North Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287, 297 (1942).
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ter to flatly declare that no other relationship between a state and
an individual can create a sufficient interest to give the state power
to grant divorces.
The Jirgin Islands Statute
The Supreme Court has never ruled on the validity, under the
due process clause, of a non-domiciliary divorce statute. It had an
opportunity to do so in connection with a statute passed by the legis-
lature of the Virgin Islands, but the Court avoided the issue. The
Virgin Islands statute22 provided that: (1) six weeks residence by a
plaintiff prior to filing for a divorce was prima facie evidence of
domicile; and (2) if the defendant were personally served within
the district or entered an appearance in the action, then the court
would have jurisdiction without further reference to domicile.
In Alton v. Alton,23 the plaintiff-wife left her home in Connecti-
cut and went to the Virgin Islands. After residing there for the
necessary six weeks she filed suit for divorce. Defendant waived ser-
vice of summons and appeared generally, ibut made no defense.
Plaintiff introduced evidence to establish her residence, but the court
asked for further proof of domicile. When no such evidence was in-
troduced, the action was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The
court of appeals affirmed the dismissal, four to three, the majority
holding that a court of a state in which neither party is domiciled has
no jurisdiction to grant a divorce. It found the presumption in the
first part of the statute to be unreasonable and held that the second
portion of the statute, empowering the court to grant a divorce de-
cree without reference to domicile, violated the due process clause of
the fifth amendment. The basis of the holding was that the domi-
ciliary state has so great an interest in the marital status of its in-
habitants that it should have exclusive power to dissolve that status.
In a strong dissent, Judge Hastie maintained that domicile was
not an invariable Constitutional principle, and that the legislature had
not acted arbitrarily in adopting personal jurisdiction over both par-
ties as a basis of jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Alton case, but dis-
missed the proceeding as moot upon learning that in the meantime
the parties had procured a valid divorce in Connecticut.
2
The issue of the validity of the Virgin Islands statute finally came
before the Supreme Court in Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith.5
On substantially the same facts as the Alton case, the Court, in a five
to three decision, held the statute invalid, but did not pass upon the
due process question. Instead, the decision was based upon the
22. V.I. Laws 3d Sess. 1953, No. 55.
23. 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), vacated as moot, 347 U.S. 911 (1954).
24. 347 U.S. 911 (1954).
25. 349 U.S. 1 (1955).
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ground that the statute was beyond the power delegated by Congress
to the Virgin Islands legislature, in that it did not deal with a subject
"of local application," but rather was designed to attract divorce-
seekers.
Thus, the Supreme Court left undecided the question of whether
such a statute would be valid if adopted by a state, rather than a
territory. How the Court would rule if faced with this issue is, of
course, a matter of conjecture, but several state courts have felt there
was ample justification for holding non-domiciliary divorce statutes
valid.
State Departures From Domicile
While the vast majority of divorce statutes base jurisdiction upon
domicile, there have been a few non-domicile statutes. Of these, only
one has been struck down by the state courts. In Jennings v. Jen-
nings,26 an Alabama statute27 dispensing with the residence require-
ment in cases in which the court has jurisdiction over both parties was
held not applicable unless one of the parties was domiciled in Ala-
bama.
On the other hand, a number of state court decisions have upheld
statutes which departed from the domicile theory.
Several states have passed statutes authorizing the granting of
divorces to military personnel stationed there for a certain period,
usually one year.28  The rationale is that servicemen are often in-
capable of acquiring a domicile, since they usually do not intend to
remain indefinitely where they are stationed. Such a statute was held
valid in Kansas as early as 1936.9
A New Mexico statute,30 providing that a member of the armed
forces is "deemed" to be domiciled in the state after one year's pres-
ence, was held valid in Crownover v. Crownover.31  However, the
court in that case held that, while domicile was still required, it was
achieved by means of the conclusive presumption. In a well-reasoned
concurring opinion, Judge McGee recognized that there was actually
no domicile here, but maintained that due process did not require
domicile. In a more recent case, 2 the court again upheld the statute,
this time following Judge McGee's reasoning.
26. 251 Ala. 73, 36 So. 2d 236 (1948).
27. ALA. CODE tit. 34, § 29 (Supp. 1955).
28. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1502 (1949); KY. REV. STAT. 5 403.035 (1955); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 42-303 (Supp. 1957); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-4 (1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 1272 (Supp. 1958); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4631 (Supp. 1958); VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-97 (Supp. 1958).
29. Craig v. Craig, 143 Kan. 624, 56 P.2d 464 (1936).
30. N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 22-7-4 (1953).
31. 58 N.M. 597, 274 P.2d 127 (1954).
32. Wallace v. Wallace, 63 N.M. 414, 320 P.2d 1020 (1958).
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A New York statute3 basing divorce jurisdiction solely upon mar-
riage within the state was upheld in David-Ziesniss v. Ziesniss.4 In
Wheat v. Wheat,3 5 the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the validity
of a statute 6 which substituted three months residence for domicile
as a jurisdictional requirement in divorce cases.
Although still small in number, these cases indicate the beginnings
of a trend away from the conventional domicile concept of divorce
jurisdiction.
Supreme Court Departures
The Supreme Court itself seems to have departed from the domi-
cile theory in cases in which the defendant was present and had an
opportunity to defend. To illustrate this, two cases decided on the
same day in 1948 must be examined. In Sherrer v. Sherrer,3 7 the
wife left Massachusetts, the couple's home, and departed for Florida,
where, after fulfilling the residence requirement, she filed suit for
divorce. The husband, served by mail, retained Florida counsel who
entered a general appearance and filed an answer denying the wife's
allegations. While the husband appeared personally to testify, he
did not controvert the wife's evidence of domicile. The divorce de-
cree granted was subsequently attacked in Massachusetts. Finding
that there had been no bona fide domicile in Florida, the Massachu-
setts court refused to grant the decree full faith and credit, but the
Supreme Court reversed, holding that since the husband had been af-
forded his day in court in Florida with respect to every issue, includ-
ing that of jurisdiction, he would not be afforded a second oppor-
tunity.
The Court applied the same rule in the companion case, Coe v.
Coe,38 which involved substantially the same facts, except that there
the respondent had appeared personally and filed an answer, admit-
ting the petitioner's allegations of domicile.
These two decisions are extensions of the principle set forth in
Davis v. Davis)" that a spouse who has appeared and litigated the
question of domicile is prevented by the doctrine of res judicata from
collaterally attacking the decree on jurisdictional grounds in a second
state. Sherrer and Coe extended the doctrine to situations in which
the defendant had an opportunity to litigate the issue, but did not
choose to do so.
The doctrine was extended to third persons in privity with the
33. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT § 1147(2).
34. 205 Misc. 836, 129 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
35. 318 S.W.2d 793 (Ark. 1958).
36. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1208.1 (Supp. 1957).
37. 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
38. 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
39. 305 U.S. 32 (1938).
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parties by Johnson v. Muelberger.40 That case held that an appear-
ance by the husband in a Florida divorce action brought by his second
wife barred an attack in New York, after the husband's death, by his
daughter.
Thus, if the defendant has merely entered an appearance, the
decree is binding, even if he did not contest the allegations of domi-
cile. This is not based upon a determination that the plaintiff had
in fact been domiciled in the state, but rather upon a doctrine - res
judicata - which precludes a participating spouse and those in
privity with him from questioning the court's jurisdiction.
Even if additional facts are available to prove that the plaintiff
had not in fact been domiciled in the granting state, such facts cannot
be the basis of a collateral attack. As Mr. Justice Clark pointed out:
[A]fter divorce, though the divorcee immediately leaves Nevada, as was
always intended, [and] ... regardless of how evident it is that there
was no domicile in the divorcing state, no other state can question the
validity of the divorce so long as both parties appeared in the action.41
In effect, the result of these cases is the compulsory recognition
of divorces obtained by mutual consent. If one of the spouses sets
up residence in an easy-divorce state and the other makes an appear-
ance, which may be through an attorney, the validity of the decree
cannot be questioned.
This departure from the domicile theory is further illustrated by
a case in which the res judicata doctrine was applied to a person who
was neither party nor privy to the original decree. In Cook v.
Cook, 2 H had married W and was living with her in Vermont when
he discovered that she was still the lawful wife of one Mann. WV se-
cured a Florida divorce from Mann and returned to Vermont, where
she remarried H. Subsequently, H brought action in Vermont to
have the marriage annulled. Finding that the divorce from Mann
was invalid because W had not been domiciled in Florida, the Ver-
mont court annulled the remarriage to H.
The Supreme Court reversed the Vermont decision, saying that
the record did not show whether Mann had entered an appearance
in the Florida action. The Court stated that if Mann had appeared
in the proceedings or had been personally served in Florida, he would
be barred by res judicata from attacking collaterally, and so would H
- a stranger to the Florida proceedings. Therefore, until it was
known what had transpired in Florida, Vermont could not relitigate
the issue of domicile.
The Cook case does not fall within the classical principles of res
judicata. Ordinarily, a judgment is res judicata only as to the parties
40. 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
41. Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1, 27 (1955) (dissenting opinion).
42. 342 U.S. 126 (1951).
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and those in privity with them.4" Instead of distorting the res judi-
cata doctrine in order to reconcile these cases with the domicile con-
cept, the Court could have explained the results more easily by accept-
ing personal jurisdiction over both parties as an independent juris-
dictional basis.
AN ALTERNATIVE TO DOMICILE
Suppose State X passes a statute in which jurisdiction to grant a
divorce is based upon a reasonable period of residence by the plain-
tiff plus personal jurisdiction over the defendant. It is urged that
such a statute would not violate the mandates of either the due
process clause or the full faith and credit clause.
Due Process
The main difficulty in the due process issue is caused by the legal
fiction that the marital status is a res which always remains at the
common domicile of the parties, or at the separate domicile of each,
and is, therefore, beyond the reach of the courts in other jurisdictions.
Thus, it is reasoned, if the forum state is not the domicile of one of
the parties, there is no res upon which the court can act, and if it at-
tempts to do so, due process is denied to the parties.
However, where the parties have separate domiciles, a court
granting an ex parte divorce does not consider the marital policies of
the state of domicile of the absent party, although the policies of the
two states may differ radically. As long as fictions must be em-
ployed, is it not far more logical to say that the marital status may
exist at a place where both parties are present? In that situation, the
court could consider the interests of both parties and the policies of
both of the domiciliary states.
It seems clear that procedural due process is satisfied if both
parties are personally subject to the jurisdiction of the court and are
actively litigating the issues of the divorce. Therefore, unless the
substantive mandates of the due process clause are being violated,
the decree should be valid.
The decision in 4lton v. Jlton44 was based upon the reasoning
that it is a "lack of due process for one state to take to itself the re-
adjustment of domestic relations between those domiciled else-
where. ' '4  But who was being deprived of due process in the Alton
case? The defendant was present and had ample opportunity to
defend. Although he alone could have complained of a denial of
due process, he did not choose to do so. If domicile serves merely to
43. Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1942); Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper
Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912).
44. 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), vacated as moot, 347 U.S. 911 (1954).
45. 207 F.2d 667, 677 (3d Cir. 1953).
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protect the interest of the state where the couple regularly lives, then
it is not required by the due process clause, which only protects per-
sons. As Mr. Justice Clark observed in his dissent in the Granville-
Smith case:
[N] either of the Granville-Smiths claims to have been deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. While the State has
an interest in the marital relationship, certainly this interest does not
come within the protection of the Due Process Clause.46
In Williams II, the three concurring justices felt that a state has
authority, so far as validity within its own borders is concerned, to
grant divorces upon whatever basis it sees fit, consistent with proce-
dural due process.4 7
The Arkansas Supreme Court has followed this view. In Wheat
v. Wheat48 that court upheld the validity of a statute49 which, in ef-
fect, substitutes three months residence for domicile as a jurisdic-
tional fact. The husband, having resided in Arkansas for the re-
quired period, filed suit for divorce. The wife, a resident of Cali-
fornia, was served by constructive process. She filed a cross-com-
plaint asking for separate maintenance, but denied the court's juris-
diction to grant a divorce. The trial court found that the husband
had not in fact established domicile in Arkansas, and, holding that
the statute was unconstitutional, dismissed the suit.
The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the trial court, holding
that the court had jurisdiction by virtue of the statute to grant a de-
cree which would be valid, at least within Arkansas. The court stated
that the possible requirements for external recognition do not affect
the validity of the decree in the state where rendered.
Although the defendant entered an appearance in the Wheat case,
the Arkansas statute permits a court to exercise jurisdiction solely
upon the basis of three months residence by the plaintiff, and to grant
an ex parte decree against an absent spouse. If the court lacks per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant, mere residence of the plaintiff
for so short a period does not appear to give Arkansas a sufficiently
close relationship to the marital status to justify an ex parte adjudi-
cation. So while the reasoning of Wheat v. Wheat may have been
justifiable according to the facts before the court, the validity of an
ex parte decree rendered under the statute would seem doubtful.
The crux of the due process issue is whether the statutory require-
ments for jurisdiction are based upon sufficient contacts between the
state and the spouses to justify exercise of the state's power to dis-
solve the marriage. A statutory provision requiring a period of resi-
dence sufficient to establish a reasonable connection between the
46. Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1955) (dissenting opinion).
47. Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226, 239 (1945) (concurring opinion).
48. 318 S.W.2d 793 (Ark. 1958).
49. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1208.1 (Supp. 1957).
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state and the parties, and containing the essential safeguard that both
parties be before the court, would provide a substantial basis for jur-
isdiction - a basis free from the uncertainties and the invitation to
perjury inherent in the domicile concept.
Full Faith and Credit
Once it is recognized that a decree granted under a non-domi-
cilary statute is valid where rendered, there is nothing to preclude its
recognition as valid everywhere. Under the full faith and credit
clause, a state can refuse to recognize the judgment of a sister state
only if the jurisdiction of the court rendering that judgment is im-
peached, the judgment was obtained by fraud, or it was penal in na-
ture.50 Therefore, if it is determined that the statutory basis of jur-
isdiction for a divorce decree is valid and the statute has been fol-
lowed, there are no grounds for denying the decree full faith and
credit.
The cases already decided by the Supreme Court present no barrier
to this conclusion. In a dictum in Williams I, the Court stated:
Domidil of the plaintiff ... is recognized... as essential in order to give
the court jurisdiction which will entitle the divorce decree to extra-
territorial effect, at least when defendant has neither been personally
served nor entered an appearance."1 (Emphasis added.)
Thus, there is the inference that domicile would not be necessary if
one of the latter two conditions were met.
All that Williams I152 held was that an ex parte divorce decree,
granted under a statute requiring domicile, need not be recognized if
the plaintiff was not in fact domiciled in the granting state. This in
no way precludes a holding that a decree granted under a valid non-
domiciliary statute is entitled to full faith and credit.
English courts, faced with a problem similar to full faith and
credit, that is, recognition of divorce decrees among members of the
Commonwealth, have reached the conclusion that extra-territorial
recognition must be afforded in certain circumstances, even in the ab-
sence of domicile.-
In Sherrer v. Sherrer" and the cases which followed it, the Su-
preme Court held that where both parties are personally before the
court, a divorce decree must be recognized as between the parties and
those in privity with them." Although those decrees were granted
under conventional statutes requiring proof of domicile, a defendant
50. STUMBERG, CoNFLicr oF LAws 111-20 (2d ed. 1951).
51. Williams v. North Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287, 297 (1942).
52. Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
53. See Travers v. Holly, [1953] 2 AI1E.R. 794; Griswold, The Reciprocal Recognition of
Divorce Decrees, 67 HARv. L. RIEv. 823 (1954).
54. 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
55. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
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under the suggested non-domiciliary statute would be in substantially
the same position. The decree could not be collaterally attacked be-
cause it could not be entered in the first place unless the defendant
had been served within the granting state or had entered an appear-
ance.
When an ex parte decree is in question, the rights of the defend-
ant and the lack of the safeguards afforded by personal jurisdiction
are strong factors to be considered. It would be anomalous to re-
quire full faith and credit for ex parte decrees despite the absence of
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and withhold recognition
where both parties had been present before the court and had fully
complied with the jurisdictional requirements of the granting state.
CHOICE OF LAW
The adoption of a concept other than domicile as a basis for di-
vorce jurisdiction gives rise to the problem of the choice of the
proper substantive law. Where jurisdiction is based upon domicile,
the fact that one of the spouses is domiciled in the forum state has
been regarded as a sufficient connection with the subject matter of
the action to enable the forum state not only to exercise jurisdiction,
but also to apply its own substantive divorce law. In other words,
the rule of jurisdiction and the rule of reference have been the same.56
However, these are two distinct problems, and if jurisdiction is
based upon something other than the traditional domicile concept,
the court must decide as an independent issue whether the forum state
has a sufficient connection with the marriage relationship to justify
applying its own substantive law. 7
The problem of the choice of law is beyond the scope of this note.
However, it should be noted that such problem does exist in addition
to the jurisdictional issue.
CONCLUSION
In maintaining the requirement of proof of domicile for divorce
jurisdiction, courts are permitting the law to fall behind the demands
of society. The real hindrance to a more sensible approach is not the
common-law tradition, but rather the policy question involved -
"liberal" v. "strict" divorce laws. Hiding behind the textbook con-
cept of domicile will not solve this problem.
Perhaps nothing short of a Uniform Divorce Law,58 adopted by
56. STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 294 (2d ed. 1951).
57. See Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 684-85 (3d Cir. 1953) (dissenting opinion). Dis-
cussing this problem, Judge Hastie suggests that under the facts of that case, if the Virgin
Islands statute were held valid, it might be necessary to apply the law of the matrimonial
domicile, Connecticut.
58. See Fenberg, Toward Uniform Divorce Laws, 41 ILL. B.J. 568 (1953) for a draft of
such a bill, as proposed by the National Association of Women Lawyers.
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